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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

: Second Version of Communist Violations Memorandum

1. On 10 May, per your request relayed by Ambassador Sullivan, we sent General Scowcroft three papers for your briefing book. One of these was a TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE memorandum entitled, "Communist Violations of the 27 January Vietnam Agreement" 10 May 1973). As requested, this memorandum drew on the full range of our collection resources. In cataloguing direct or presumptive Communist violations of the 27 January Agreement, the memorandum identified the sources on which individual items were based and was explicitly candid about our areas of doubt or uncertainty.

- 2. After that 10 May Communist violations memorandum had been received, Mr. Stearman (on your behalf) asked that we rewrite it in a version that, if you so desired, could be handed to the North Vietnamese during the course of your session with Le Duc Tho. Attached is our response to this request.
- 3. Preparing this second version was not an easy task and required the exercise of a good deal of discretionary judgment. We naturally wanted to keep the memorandum sufficiently explicit and detailed to meet your needs. At the

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	same time, we had to avoid undue risk of compromise to our collection sources and methods, which would prejudice our
ſ	ability to serve you in the future.
L	To the best of our ability we have tried to meet both requirements.

5. In revising the original 10 May memorandum to make it suitable for possible passage to the North Vietnamese, we also made several other types of editorial change. We decided to eliminate all statements we considered "against interest," i.e., language that the North Vietnamese could turn against us or exploit (out of context) to score debating or propaganda points. Hence, we excised all indications of doubt or uncertainty and all references to GVN evidence or activity that could be debatable. If you use this text, we would respectfully suggest that you term it a catalogue of representative examples of the kind of Communist activity we are protesting, leaving its recipients in some doubt about just how much more we know.

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6. We are sending five copies of this revised memorandum to you for your and your staff's use. We are also sending one copy to Ambassador Sullivan. We plan no further distribution unless you instruct otherwise. If you desire any further changes or editorial modifications to make this document optimum for your needs, please let us know.

James R. Schlesinger Director

Attachments